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1. The Sources of the Latest Turn. 
TACTICAL turns, even wide ones, are absolutely un-
avoidable in our epoch. They are necessitated by 
the abrupt turns of the objective situation (the lack 
of stable international relations; sharp and irregu-
lar fluctuations of conjuncture ; sharp reflections 
of the economic fluctuations in politics; the impul-
siveness of the masses under the influence of the feel-
ing of helples ness, etc. etc.) . Attentive watchful-
ness over the changes in. the objective situation is 
now far more important and at the same time an im-
measurably more difficult task than prior to the 
war, in the epoch of the "organic" development of 
capitalism. The leadership of the Party now finds 
itself in the position of a chau:ff eur who drives his 
automobile on a mountain, over the sharp zig-zags 
of the road. An untimely turn, incorrectly applied 
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apeedt threaten the paasengers and the car with the 
greatest danger, if not with destruction. 
The leadership of the Communist Interna-
tional ha given us example in recent years of very 
abrupt turns. The latest of them we observe these 
last months. What has called forth the turns of the 
Communist International ince the death of Lenin? 
The changes- in the objective situation? No. It can 
be said with confidence: beginning with 1923, there 
was not a single tactical tum made in time by the 
Comintern under the influence of correctly estimated 
changes in the objective conditions. On the con-
trary : every turn was the result of the unbearable 
sharpening of the contradictions between the line 
of the Comintern and the objective situation. We 
are witnessing the very same thing this time, too. 
The Ninth Plenum of the E. C. C. I., the 
Six.th Congress, and particularly the Tenth Plenum, 
adopted a course towards an abrupt and direct rev-
olutionary rise (the "third period"), which was ab-
solutely excluded at the time by the objective sit-
ua.tion w ting after the greatest defeats in Eng-
land and China, the weakening of the Communist 
Parties throughout the world, and particularly un-
der the condition of a commercial and indu trial as-
cent which embraced a eries of the mo t important 
capitali t countrie . The tactical turn in the Com-
munist International beginning with F bruary 1928, 
was therefore dir ctly contrary to the actual turn 
of the historic road. From the e contradictions 
aro e : the tendencies of adventurism, the further 
isolation of the Partie from the masses, the weak-
ening of the organizations, etc. Only after all these 
phenomena had clearly assumed a menacing charac-
ter did the leadership of the Comintern make a new 
turn in February 1980, backward from, and to the 
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Right of, the tactics of the "third period". 
It is the irony of fate, unmerciful to all 
chvostism•, that the new tactical turn .in the Com-
intern coincided chronologically with the new turn 
in the objective conditions. An international crisis 
of unpr cedented a.cuteness undoubtedly opens per-
spectives for the radicalization of the masses and 
social convulsions. Precisely under such circum-
stances, a turn to the Left could and should have 
been made, that is, to adopt a bold speed on the 
path of revolutionary rise. This would have been 
absolutely correct and necessary if, in the last three 
years, the leadership of the Comintern had utilized 
as it should have the period of economic revival and 
the revolutionary ebb to strengthen the positions 
of the Party in the mass organizations, above all in 
the trade unions. Under such circumstances, the 
chauffeur could and should have shifted his gears in 
1930 from second into third speed, or at least pre-
pared for such a change in the nearest future. In 
reality the directly oppo ite process took place. So 
as not to go over the cliff, the chauffeur had to 
change from the prematurely adopted speed to the 
econd, and to slow down the pace. When? Under 
circumstances which, with the correct strategical 
line, would have made neces ary its acceleration. 
Such is the crying contra.diction between the tac-
tical nece ity and strategical perspective, a contra-
diction in which, by the logic of the mistakes of their 
leadership the Communist Parties find themselves 
in a number of countrie . 
We see this contradiction mo t strikingly 
and dangerou ly now in Germany, where the last 
•Literally, "tall-Ism' ' that is, the theory or practise of 
follow~g at the tau of event.a. 
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elections revealed an exceptionally peculiar relation 
of forces, resulting not only from the two periods 
of Germany's post-war stabilization, but also from 
the three periods of the Comintern's mistakes. 
2. T h e P a r I i a m e n t a r y V i c t o r y o f 
the Communist Party in the Light 
o f t h e R e v o I 11 t i o n a r y T a s k s. 
The official press of the Comintern is now de-
picting the results of the German elections as a pro-
digious victory of Communism, :which places on the 
order of the day the slogan of a Soviet Germany. 
The bureaucratic optimists do not want to reflect 
upon the meaning of the relation of forces which is 
disclosed by the election statistics. They examine 
the figure of the Communi t vote gained independ-
ently of the revolutionary task created by the 
situation and the obstacle it sets up. The Com-
munist Party received around 4,600,000 votes as 
against 8,800,000 in 1928. Fr>dm the viewpoint 
of ''normal" parliamentary mechanics, the gain of 
1,800,000 votes i considerable even if we take into 
consideration the ri e in the total number of voters. 
Dut the gain of the Party pales completely beside 
the leap of Fascism from 800,000 to 6,400,000 
votes. Of no less important signiDcance for evalu-
ating the elections is the fact that the social demo-
cracy, in spite of substantial losses, retained its 
basic cadres and till received a considerably great-
er number of workers' votes than the Communist 
Party. 
Meanwhile, if we should ask ourselves, What 
combination of international and domestic circum-
stances could be capable of turning the working 
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class towards Communi m with greater velocity? we 
could not find an example of more favorable circum-
stances for such a turn than the situat~on in 
present-day Germany: Young's noose, the economic 
crisis, the disintegration of the ruler , the crisi of 
parliamentarism, the terrific self-exposure of the 
social democracy in power. From the viewpoint of 
these concrete historical circumstances, the specific 
gravity of the German Communist Party in the 
social life of the country, in spite of the gain of 
1,300,000 votes, remains proportionately small. 
The weakne s of the po itions of Commun-
ism, inextricably bound up with the policy and 
regime of the Comintern, is revealed more clearly if 
we compare the present social weight of the Com-
munist Party with those concrete and unpo tpon-
able ta ks which the present historical circum-
tance put before it. 
It i true that the Communist Party itself 
did not expect such a gain. But this proves that 
under the blows of mi takes and def eats, the leader• 
ship of the Communi t Parties has become disac-
cu tomed from big aim and perspectives. If ye -
terday it underestimated its own possibilities, then 
today it once more undere timates the difficulties. 
In this way, one danger i multiplied by another. 
In the meantime, the first characteristic of 
a real revolutionary Party-is to be able to look 
reality in the face. 
8. T h e V a c i 11 a t i o n s o f t h e B i g 
Bourgeoisie. 
With every turn of the historic road, with 
every social crisis, we mu t over and over again ex-
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amine the question of the mutual relationa of the 
three classes in modern society: the big bourgeoi-
sie, led by finance capital; the petty bourgeoise, 
vacillating between the basic camps; and finally, the 
proletariat. 
The big bourgeoisie, making up a negligible 
part of the nation, cannot .hold power without the 
support of the petty bourgeoisie of the city and the 
village, that is, of the remnants of the old, and the 
mas es of the new, middle classes. In the present 
epoch, this support acquires two basic forms pol-
itically antagonistic to each other but historically 
supplementary: social democracy and Fascism. 
In the person of the social democracy, the petty 
bourgeoise, which follows finance capital, leads be-
hind it millions of workers. 
The big German. bourgeoiaie is vacillating 
at present ; it is split up, Its disagreements are ex-
hausted by the question: Whlch of the two methods 
of cure for the socia) crisis shall be applied at 
pre ent? The social democratic therapy repels 
one part of the big bourgeoisie with the indefinite-
ness of its results, and with the danger of too great 
levie (taxes, social legislation, wage ) . The sur-
gical intervention of Fascism seems to the other part 
to be uncalled for by the situation and too risky. 
In other words, the finance bourgeoisie as a whole 
vacillates in the evaluation of the situation, not see-
ing sufficient basis as yet for the proclamation of an 
offensive of its own ''third period", when the social 
democracy is unconditionally replaced by .Fascism, 
when, generally speaking, it undergoes a general an-
nihilation for its services rendered. The vacillations 
of the big bourgeoisie-with a weakening of .its basic 
parties-between the social democracy and Fascism 
are an extraordinarily clear symptom of a pre-rev-
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olutionary situation. With the approach of the 
real revolutionary situation, these vacillations, it ia 
understood, will come to an end immediately. 
4. T h e P e t t y B o u r g e o i s i e 
a n d F a s c i s m. 
In order that the social crisis may bring 
about the proletarian revolution, it is necessary 
that, besides other conditions, a decisive shift of the 
petty bourgeois classes occurs in the direction of 
the proletariat. This gives the proletariat & 
chance to put itself at the head of the nation as its 
leader. 
The last election revealed-and this is where 
its principal symptomatic significance lies-a shift 
in the opposite direction. Under the blow of the 
crisis, the petty bourgeoisie swung, not in the 
direction of the proletarian revolution, but in the 
direction of the most extreme imperialist reaction, 
pulling behind it considerable sections of the pro-
letariat. 
The gigantic growth of national-socialism 
is an ex.pre sion of two factors : a deep social crisis, 
throwing the petty bourgeois masses off balance, 
and the lack of a revolutionary Party that would 
be regarded by the masses of the people as an ac-
knowledged revolutionary leader. If the Communist 
Party is the Party of reoolu.ti<ni.ary hope, then Fas-
cism, a a mass movement, is the party of counter-
reooZuticmary <le1pair. When revolutionary hope 
embraces the whole proletarian mass, it inevitably 
pulls behind it on the road of revolution consider-
able and growing sections of the petty bourgeoise. 
Precisely in the sphere, the election revealed the 
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opposite picture: counter-revolutionary de pair em-
braced the petty bourgeoi ma s with uch a 
force that it drew behind it many sections of the 
proletariat. 
How i this to be expla.in.ed? In the past, 
we have observed (Ital , Germany) a sharp 
trengthening of Fascism, victorious or at least 
threatening, as a re ult of a spent or missed revolu-
tionary situation, at the conclusion of a revolution-
ary crisis in which the proletarian vanguard reveal-
ed its inability to put itself at the head of the nation 
and change the fate of all its cla es, the petty 
bourg oi e included. This is precisely ' hat gave 
Fa cism its peculiar strength in Italy. But at pre-
sent, the problem in Germany does not arise at the 
conclusion of a revolutionary crisis but only at its 
approach. From this, the leading Party official , 
optimi ts ex-officio, draw the conclusion that Fa -
ci m, having come "too late", is doomed to inevitable 
and speedy defeat (RoTE FA.HNE). These people 
do not want to learn anything. Fascism comes "too 
late" in relation to old revolutionary crises. But it 
appear sufficiently early-at the dawn- in relation 
to the new revolutionary crisis. The fact that it 
gained the po ibility to take up such a powerful 
starting position on the eve of a revolutionary 
period and not at its conclusion, is not the weak 
side of Fascism but the weak side of Communism. 
The petty bourgeoi i does not wait- as a conse-
quence of new disappointments in the ability of the 
Party to improve its fate-it ba es itself upon the 
experiences of the past, it remembers the les on of 
1923, the capricious leaps of the ultra-Left course 
of Maslow-Thiilmann, the opportunist impotence of 
the same Thalmann, the clatter of the "third 
period", etc. Finally-and this is the most imporl-
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ant-it lack of faith in the proletarian revolution 
is nourished by the lack of faith in the Communist 
Party on the part of millions of social democratic 
workers. The petty bourgeoisie, even when com-
pletely thrown off the conservative roa-0 by circum-
stance , clln turn to the social revolution only when 
the sympathies of the majority of the working class 
are for the social revolution. Precisely this most 
important condition is still lacking in Germany, 
and not by accident. 
The programmatic declaration of the Ger-
man Communist Party before the elections was com-
pletely and exclusively devoted to Fascism as the 
main enemy. Neverthele s, Fasci m came out the 
victor, gathering not only millions of semi-prole-
tarian elements, but also many hundreds of thou-
sand of industrial workers. This is an expression 
of the fact that in spite of the parliamentary vic-
tory of the Communist Party, the proletarian rev-
olution as a whole su.ff ered a serious defeat in this 
election, it is understood, of a preliminary, warning, 
a d not decisive character. It can become decisive 
and will inevitably become decisive, if the Communist 
Party is unable to evaluate its partial parliamen-
tary victory in connection with this "preliminary'' 
character of the defeat of the revolution as a whole, 
and draw from this all the nec~ssary conclusions. 
Fa1ci1m in Germany ha1 become a real dan-
ger, as an acute expression of the helpless position 
of the bourgeois regime, the conservative role of 
the social democracy in this regime, and the ac-
cumulated powerlessness of the Communist Party 
to abolish it. Whoever denies this is either blind or 
a braggart. 
, In 1923, Brandler, in spite of all our warn-
m , monstrously exaggerated the forces of Fascism. 
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From the wrong evaluation of the relationship of 
forces grew a hesitating, evasive, defensive, coward-
ly policy. Thi destroyed the revolution. Such 
events do not pa without leaving traces in the 
consciousne of all the classes of the nation. The 
overestimation of Fa cism by the Communist leader-
ship created one of the conditions for its further 
strengthening. The contrary mi take, this very un-
derestimation of Fa cism by the pre ent leader-
ship of the Communist Party, may lead the revolu-
tion to a more severe era h for many year to come. 
The danger acquire particular acutenes 
in connection with the que tion of the te?npo of de-
velopment, which doe not depend upon us alone. 
The malarial character of the political curve re-
vealed by the election speaks for the fa.ct that the 
tempo of development of the national crisi may 
turn out to be very speedy. In other words, the 
course of events in the very near future may resur-
rect in Germany on a new historical plane, the old 
tragic contradiction between the maturity of a rev-
olutionary situation, on the one hand, and the eak-
ness and strategical impotence of the revolutionary 
Party on the other. This mu t be said clearly, open-
ly, and above all, in time. 
5. T h e C o m m u n i s t P a r t y a n d t h e 
Working Class. 
It ould be a monstrous mistake to console 
oneself with the fact, for instance, that the Bolshevik 
Party in April 1917, after the arrival of Lenin, 
when the Party first began to prepare for the 
seizure of power, had le s ~han 80,000 members and 
led behind itself, even in Petrograd, not more than 
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a third of the workers and a far smaller part of 
the soldiers. The situation in Russia was altogether 
different. The revolutionary Partie came out of 
the underground only in March, after an almost 
three year interruption of even that strangled pol-
itical life which exi ted prior to the war. The work-
ing class during the war renewed itself approxi-
mately forty percent. The overwhelming mass of 
the proletariat did not know the Bolsheviks, he.d 
not even heard of them. The voting for the Men-
sheviks and S. R.'s in March-June wa11 simply an 
expression of the first hesitating steps after the 
awakening. In this voting there was not even a 
shadow of disappointment with the Bol heviks or 
accumulated lack of faith in them, which may re-
sult from the mistakes of the Party, checked up 
by the experience of the masses. On the contrary. 
Every day of revolutionary experience in 1917 
pushed the masses away from the conciliators and 
to the side of the Bolshevik . From thi followed 
the stormy, inexorable growth of the ranks of the 
Party, and particularly of its inftuence. 
The ituation in Germany ha at its root 
a different character, in this respect as well as in 
others. The German Communi t Party did not come 
upon the scene yesterday, nor the day before. In 
1928, it had behind it, openly or in a semi-concealed 
form, the majority of the working class. In 1924, 
on the ebbing wan, it received 3,600,000 votes, a 
greater percentage of the working class than at 
present. This meana that those workers who remain-
ed with the social democracy, as well as those who 
voted this time for the National Socialists, did so 
not out of simple ignorance, not because they &wak-
ened only yesterday, not because they have as yet 
had no chance to know what the Communi t Party 
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is, but because they have no faith., on the basis of 
their own experience in the recent years. 
Let us not forget that in February 1928, 
the Ninth Plenum of the E:x:ecutive Committee of 
the Comintern gave the signal for an intensified, 
extraordinary, irreconcilable struggle again t " o-
cial Fascism." The German ocial democracy was 
in power almost all this time, revealing to the masses 
at every step it criminal and shameful role. And 
all this wa supplemented by an enormous economic 
crisis. It would be difficult to invent circum tance 
more favorable for the weakening of the social de-
mocracy. Neverthele s, it retained it basic posi-
tion . How is tbi stn1cing fact to be explained? 
Only by the fact that the leader hip of the Com-
muni t Party, by its whole policy, a i ted the social 
democracy supporting it from the L ft. 
This does not at all mean that by voting 
for the social democracy, five to six million work-
ing men and women expre sed their full and unlimit-
ed confidence in it. The social demo~ratic workers 
should not be consid red blin . They are not at 
all o naive about their own leader , but they do 
not see a different way out for them elves in the 
gi en situation. Of cour e, we a.re not speaking of 
the labor aristocracy and bu eaucracy, but of the 
rank and file worker . The policy of the Communist 
Party doe not inspire them with confidence, not 
because the Communi t Party i a revolutionary 
Party but becau e they do not believe in its ability 
to gain a revolutionary victory, and do not wish 
to risk their heads in vain. Voting reluctantly for 
the social democracy, these workers do not e:x:press 
confidence in it, but for that they expre their 
~ack of confidence in the Communist Party. This 
is where the great difference lie between the pre-
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sent position of the German Communists and the 
position of the Rus11ian BolsheTiks in 1917. 
But by this alone, the difficulties are not 
exhausted: Inside the Communist Party itself, and 
particularly in the circle of its supporters and the 
workers voting for it, is a great reserve of vague 
lack of faith in the leadership of the Party. From 
thi grows what is called the "disparity" between 
the general influence of the Party and it numeri-
cal strength, and particularly with it role :in the 
trade unions- in Germany such a disparity un-
doubtedly e.x:i ts. The official expla.n.ation of the 
di parity is that the Party has not b en able to 
"strengthen" its influence organizationally. Here 
the mass is looked upon as purely passive material, 
which nters or does not enter the Party, depend-
ing exclusively upon whether the secretary can grab 
every worker by the throat. The bureaucrat does 
not understand that workers have their own mind, 
their experience, their will, and therr active or pa -
ive policy toward the Party. The worker votea 
for the Party- for its banner, for the October rev-
olution, for his own future revolution. But by re-
fusing to join the Communist Party or to follow 
it in the trade union struggle, he says that he has 
no faith in its daily policy. The "disparity" is 
consequently, in the final analysis, an expression 
of the lack of confidence of the mas es in the present 
leadership of the Communist International. And 
this lack of confidence c eated and strengthened by 
mistakes, def eats, fictions and direct deception of 
the masses from 1928 to 1930, is one of the greateat 
hindrances on the road to the victory of the pro-
letarian revolution. 
Without an internal confidence in itself, the 
Party will not conquer the class. Not to conquer 
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the proletariat means not to break the petty bour-
geois masses away from Fascism. One is inextric-
ably bound up with the other. 
6. B a c k t o t h e ' ' S e c o n d ' ' P e r i o d o r 
Once More Towards the "Third"? 
If we were to use the official term_inology 
of Centrism, we would formulate the problem in the 
following form : The leadership of the Co min tern 
foisted the tactic of the "third period" upon the 
national sections, that is, the tactic of an immediate 
revolutionary upsurge at a time (1928) when the 
feature of the "second period" were most clearly 
visible, that is, the stabilization of the bour-
geoisie and the ebb and decline of the revolution. 
The turn from this, which came in 1930, meant a 
rejection of the tactic of the "third period" in favor 
of the tactic of the "second period". In the mean-
time, this turn made its way through the bureau-
cratic apparatus at a moment when the most im-
portant symptom began at any rate in Germany, 
to ignalize plainly th rea.l approach of a "th'rd 
period." Does the need for a new tactical turn Bow 
from all this-in the direction of the recently abau-
doned tactic of the "third period"? 
We use these designations so as to make the 
posing of this problem more accessible to those 
circles whose minds are clogged up by the method-
ology and terminology of the Centrist bureaucracy. 
But we have no intention whatever to adopt thia 
terminology, which conceals a combination of Sta-
linist burea.ucratism and Bucharinist metaphys-
ics. We reject the apocalyptic presentation of the 
"third" period as the final one: How many periodt 
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there will be before the victory of the proletariat 
is a question of the relation of forces and the changes 
in the situation; all this can be tested only through 
action. We reject the very essence of this strate-
gic schematicism with its numbered period.w; there 
is no abstract tactic established in advance for 
the "second" and the ''third" periods. It is under-
stood that we cannot ~chieve victory and the sei-
zure of power without an armed uprising. But how 
shall we reach this uprising? By what methods? 
And at what tempo shall we mobilize the masses? 
This depends not only upon the objective situa-
tion in general, but in the first place, upon the 
state in which the arrival of the social crisis in the 
country finds the proletariat, upon the relation 
between the Party and the classt the proletariat 
and the petty bourgeoisie, etc. The state of the 
proletariat at the threshhold of the "third period" 
depends in its turn upon the tactic the Party ap-
plied in the period preceding it. 
The normal, natural change of tactics, with 
the present turn of the situation in Germany, should 
have b en the acce'teration of tempo, the sharpen-
ing of alogana and methods of 1troggle. This tac-
tical turn would have been normal and natural 
only if the tempo and slogans of struggle of ye11-
terday had corresponded to the conditions of the 
preceding period. But this never occurred. The 
sharp discordance of the ultra-Left policy and the 
stabilized situation is precisely the reason for the 
tactical tUl'n. What ha.s resulted is that at the 
moment when the new turn of the objective situa-
tion, along with the unfavorable general re-
grouping of the political forces, brought Com-
munism a big gain of votes, the Party turns out to 
be strategically and tactically more disorientated, 
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entangled, and off the track than ever before. 
To make clearer the contradiction fallen 
info by the German Communi t Party, like most 
of the other sections of the Comintern, only far 
deeper than the rest of them let tis take the sim-
plest compari on. In order to j WDE over a bar-
rier, a preliminary running start i necessary. The 
higher the barrier, the more important it is to 
start the run on time, not too late and not too 
early, in order to approach the ob truction with the 
n ce sary reserve of strength. Beginning with Feb-
ruary 1928, and esp cially since July 1929, how-
ver, the German Communist Party did nothing 
but take the running start. It is no wonder that 
the Party began to lo e its wind and drag it feet . 
The Comintern finally gave the command : " ingle 
quick time!" But no sooner had the winded Party 
sta1·ted to change to a more normal step, than be-
fore it began to appear not an imaginary but an 
a.ctual barrier w]uch might require a revolutionary 
jump. 
there be enough distance for taking 
the run? Shall the turn be rejected and. changed 
to a counter-turn? These are the tactical and 
st:qitegic que tions which appear before tht: Ger-
man Party in all their acutene s. 
In order that the leading cadres of the Party 
hould be able to find a correct reply to the e que -
tions they must have th chance to judge the clo e t 
section of the road in connection with the strategy 
of the pa t years and its con equences, a revealed 
in thi election. If in opposition to this, the bureau-
cracy should succeed, by cries of victory, to drown 
the voice of political self-criticism, th.is would in-
evitably lead the prol tariat to a catastrophe 
more terrible than that of 1923. 
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7. The Possible Variations of the 
Further Development. 
A revolutionary situation, confronting the 
proletariat with the immediate problem of seizing 
power, is made up of objective and subjective ele-
ments, each bound with the other, and to a large 
extent, conditioning each other. But this mutual 
dependence is relative The law of uneven develop-
ment applies fully al o to the factors of a revolu-
tionary situation. An insufficient development of 
one of them may produce a condition in wl1i.ch the 
revolutionary situation either does not come to an 
explosion and spends itself, or coming to an ex-
plosion, ends in defeat for the revolutionary work-
ing class. What is the situation in Germany in this 
respect? 
1. A deep national crisis (economy, inter-
national situation) is unquestionably at hand. 
There appears to be no way out along the normal 
road of the bourg oi parliamentar regime. 
2. The political crisis of the ruling class 
and its s stem of government is absolutel:y indu-
bitable. This is not a parliamentary crisis, but a 
~risis of clas rule. 
3. The revolutionary cla however is 
still deeply split by internal contradictions. The 
strengthening of the revolutionary Party at the 
expense of the reformists is as yet at its inception, 
and has been proceeding thus far at a tempo which 
is far from corresponding with the depth of the 
crisis. 
4. The petty bourgeoisie, at the very be-
ginning of the crisis, has already assumed a posi-
tion antagonistic to the preaent aya~em of capitalist 
rule, but at the a.me time mortally hostile to the 
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proletarian revolution. 
In other words: there are at hand the basic 
objective conditions for a proletarian revolution; 
there is one of it political conditions (the state of 
the ruling cla s) ; the other political condition (the 
t te of the proletariat) ha fir t begun to change 
in the direction of revolution, and 6 cau e of f.he 
heritage of the past, cannot change rapidly; fin-
ally, the third political condition (the state of the 
petty bourgeoi ie) is not directed towards the pro-
letarian revolution but toward a bourgeois count-
er-revolution. The chang of thi la t condition 
into a favorable one cannot be accomplished with-
out radical changes in the proletariat it elf, that 
is, without the political liquidation of the social 
democracy. 
We have, thus, a deeply contradictory sit-
uation. Some of its factors put the proletarian 
revolution on the order of the day: others, how-
ever, exclude the po ibility of its victory in the 
next pe'riod, that is, without a previous deep change 
in the polit.ical relation of force . 
Theoretically, everal variations of the fur-
ther development of the present situation in Ger-
many can be considered, depending upon objective 
factors, the policy of the cla s enemies included, 
a well as the conduct of the Communist Party 
itself. Let us note chematically four po ible vari-
ations of development. 
1. The CQJDJDwrist Party, frightened by 
its own strategy of the "third period", moves 
ahead gropingly, with extreme caution, avoiding 
ri ky steps and-without giving battle, misses a 
revolutionary situation. This would mean a repeti-
tion of the policy of Brandler in 1921-1923, 
only changed in form. Re:B.ecting the pressure of the 
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social democracy, the Brandlerists and semi-Brand-
lerists, outside the Party as well as inside of it, 
will drive in this direction. 
2. Under the influence of the election suc-
ces , the Party, on the contrary, makes a new sharp 
turn to the Left, in the direction of a direct strug-
gle for power, and being a arty of the active min-
ority, suffers a cata trophic defeat. Driving in this 
direction are: Fascism; the clamorous, senseless 
agitation of the apparatus which doe not weigh 
anything, which does not enlighten, but stupefies ; 
the despair and impatience of a part of the working 
class, particularly the unemployed youth. 
a. It is further possible that the leader-
ship, rejecting nothing, will attempt empirically 
to find a middle course between the dangers of the 
first two variation.s,and in this connection, will com-
mit a series of new mistakes and, in general, will 
so slowly elim,inate the lack of confide.nee of the 
proletarian and emi-proletarian masse , that by 
that time the objective conditions will have chang-
ed in a direction unfavorable for a revolution, giv-
ing way to a new period of stabilization. It is 
chiefly in this celectic direction, combining chvoBt-
iam in general with adventurism in particular, that 
the Moscow Stalinist top is pushing the German 
Party, fearing to take a clear position and pre-
paring an alibi for itself beforehand, that is, the 
possibility to throw responsibility over to the "ex-
ecutor "- at the Right or at the Left, depending 
upon the results. This policy, with which we are 
familiar enou~, sacrifices the international-his-
torical interests oi the proletariat to the interests 
of the ''presti " of the bureaucratic top, Intima-
tions of such a course are alrea.dy given in PRAVDA 
of September 16. 
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4. Finally, the most propitiou , or more 
correctly, the only propitious variation: the Ger-
man Party, through the effort of its be t and 
most conscious element , take a careful survey of 
the whole pre ent contradictory situation. .By a 
correct, audacious and flexible policy, the Party, 
on the basis of the present situ~tion, till ucceeds 
to unite the majority of the proletariat and to 
secure a change of front of the semi-proletarian 
and mo t oppressed petty bourgeois ma e . The 
proletarian vanguard, as the leader of the nation 
of the toilng and oppre sed comes to victory. 
To help the Party change it policy towards this 
course is the ta k of the .Bolshevik-Leninist (Left 
Opposition). 
It would be fruitless to guess which of these 
variations has more chances to happen in the n t 
period. Such questioDB are not decided by gue ses 
but by struggle. 
One of its necessary elements is an irrecon-
cilable ideological truggle against the Centrist 
leadership of the Com.intern. From Moscow, the 
signal has already been given for a policy of bur-
eaucratic prestige which covers up the mistakes 
of ye terday and prepares tomorrow' by the false 
cries about the new triumph of the line. Monstrous-
ly exaggerating the victory of the Party, mon-
strou ly underestimating the difficulties, interpret-
ing even the succe of Fa ci m a a positive factor 
for the proletarian revolution, PRAVDA neverthe-
less explains b,riefiy: "The successes of the Party 
should not make us dizzy." The treacherou.s policy 
of the Stalinist leadership is true to itself even here. 
The analysis of the situation is given in the spirit 
of uncritical ultra-Leftism. In thi way the Party 
i consciously pushed on the road of adventurism. 
22 
At the same time, Stalin prepares his alibi in ad-
vance with the aid of the ritualistic phrase about 
"dizziness". It is precisely this policy, short-sight-
ed, unscrupulous, that may ruin the German revo-
lution. 
8. W h e r e i s t h e W a y 0 u t ? 
We have given above, without any glossing 
over or embellishment, an analysis of the difficult-
ies and dangers which are related fully to the pol-
itical and subjective sphere, which grew primarily 
out of the mistakes and crimes of the epigone lead-
ership, and which now definitely threaten to demol-
i h a new revolutionary situation developing before 
our ery eyes. The officials will either close their 
eye to our analysi or else they will replenish their 
stock of slander. But it is not a matter of hope-
less official ; it concerns the fate of the German 
proletariat. In the Party, as well as in the appar-
atus, there are not a few people who observe and 
think, and who will be compelled tomorrow by sharp 
circumstances to think with doubled intensity. It 
~s to them we direct our analysis and our conclus-
ions. 
Every critical ituation has great sources 
of indefinitene . Moods, views and forces, ho tile 
and friendly, are formed ;in the very process of the 
crisis. They cannot be foreseen mathematically. 
They must be measured in the process of the strug-
gle, through struggle and on the basis of the e liv-
ing measurement , necessary corrections must be 
made in the policy. 
Can the strength of the conservative resist-
ance of the social democratic workers be calculated 
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before.band? It cannot. In the light of the events 
of the past year, this strength seems to be gigantic. 
But the truth is that what helped most of all to weld 
together social democracy was the wrong policy of 
the Communist Party, which found its highest gen-
eralization in the absurd theory of social Fasci m. 
To measure the real resistance of the social dem-
ocratic rank , a diff'erent measuring instrument is 
required, that is, a correct Communist tactic. With 
this condition-and it is not small condition-
the degree of internal unity of the social democracy 
can be revealed in a comparatively brief period. 
In a different form, what has been said above 
also applies to Fascism: It emanated, aside from 
the other conditions present, in the tremblings of 
the Zinoviev-Stalin striategy. What is its fo:rce 
for offensive? What is its stability? Has it reach-
ed it culminating point, as the outimists ex-officio 
a sure us, or is it only on the first step of the lad-
der? This cannot be foretold mechanically. It can 
be . determine.d only. through action. Precisely in 
regard to Fascism, which is a. razor in the ban 
of the class enemy, the wrong policy of the Com-
intern may produce fatal results in a brief period. 
On the other hand, a correct policy-not in uch a. 
short period, it is true---ean undermine the posi-
tions of Fascillm. 
A revolutionary Party, at the time of a 
crisis in the r~gime, is much honger in the extra-
parliamentary ma s struggles than within the 
framework of parlirunentarism. Again, on only 
one condition: if it can conectly estimate the situa-
tion and connect in practise the living needs of the 
masses with the task of seizing power. Everything 
is now reduced to this. It would therefore be the 
greatest mistake to see in the present situation in 
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Germany only dllliculties and dangers. No. The 
situation also reveals tremendous possibilities, pro-
viding it is clearly and thoroughly understood and 
correctly utilized. 
What is needed for this? 
1. A forced turn to the "Right" at a time 
when the circumstances turn ''Leftward", demands 
a particularly attentive, scrupulous and cape.hie 
viewing of the further changes of all the factors 
in the situation. 
The abstract contrasting of the meth·ods of 
the second and third periods must be immediately 
rejected. The ituation must be taken a it is, 
with all its contradictions and the live dynamics of 
its development. We mu t keep vigilantly abreast 
of the real changes in the situation and influence 
it in the direction of its real development, and not 
to fit into the patterns of Molotov and Kuu inen. 
To be orientated in the situation-is the 
mo t important and most difficult part of the ta k. 
By the btireaucratic methods, it cannot be solved 
at all. Statistics, important though they are by 
th ems el es, are insufficient for this purpose. It is 
necessary to sound the very deepe t ma s of the 
proletariat and the toilers in general. Not only 
mu t live and attractive slogam be advanced but 
we must trace the hold they get on the mas ea. 
This can be achieved only by an active Party which 
puts out tens of thousand of feelers everywhere, 
which gathers their testimony, considers all the 
question and actively works out its collective view-
point. 
2. The question of the Party regime is in-
extricably bound up with this. People appointed 
by Moscow, independent of the confidence or lack 
of confidence of the Party, will not be able to 
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lead the masses in an as a.ult upon capitalist soc-
iety. The more artificial the present regime, the 
deeper will be its cri i in the days and hours of 
decision. Of all the "turns," the most important 
and urgent one applie to the Party ~gime. It is 
a question of life and death. 
8. The change in the regime is the pre-
condition for a change in the course, and together 
with it, its consequences. One is inconceivable 
without the other. The Party must break away 
from the atmosphe1·e of deceit, re ervations, silence 
over real calamitie , the praising of spurious values 
-in a word, from the disastrous ntmo phere of 
Stalinism, which i not created by ~Jeological and 
political influence but by the crude, material depend-
ence of the apparatus and the methods of command-
ing based upon it. One of the necessary conditions 
for the liberation of the Party from bureaucratic 
bondage is a general examination of the "general 
line" of the German lea.deli· hip, begin~ng with 
1923, and even with the March days of 1921. The 
Left Oppositio~ in a number of documents and 
theoretical works, has given its evaluation of all 
the stages of the unfortunate officio.I policy of the 
Comintern. This criticism mu t become the pro-
perty of the Party. To avoid it or to be silent 
about it will not be po sible. The Party will not 
ri e to the height of its great ta k if it does not 
freely evaluate its present in the light of it past. 
If the Communist Party, in spite of the 
exceptionally favorable cicumstances, ha proved 
powerle seriou ly to shake the strudure of the 
social democracy with the a.id of the formula of 
"social Fasci m," then real Fascism now threatens 
this structure, no longer with wordy formulre of 
socalled radicalism, but with the chemical formulie 
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of explosives. No matter how true it is that the 
social democracy by its whole policy prepared the 
blo oming of Fasci m, it is no less true that Fas-
ci m comes fo a.rd a a dea.dly threat p imarily 
to that same social democracy all of who e magni-
ficence is inextricably bound with parliamentary-
democratic-pacifist forms and methods of govern-
ment. 
There can be no doubt that at the crucial 
moment the leaders of the social democracy and a 
thin layer of labor aristocrats will prefer the tri-
umph of Fasci m to the revolutionary dictator hip 
of the proletariat. It is precisely the approach of 
uch a choice that create exceptional difficulties 
for the ocial democratic leaders among their own 
worker . The policy of a united front of the work-
er againt Fa ci m flow from thi ituation. It 
opens up tremendous po sibilities to the Commun-
i t Party. A condition for ucc s, however is 
the i·ejection of the theory and practi e of " ocial 
Fa ci m," the harm of which becomes a positive 
menace under he pre ent circum ta.nee . 
The social crisis will inevitably produce deep 
c1ea age within the social democmcy. The radic-
alization of the masse will affect the ocial demo-
crat . We will inevitably have to make agree-
ments with the various social democratic organiza-
tion and faction again t Fa cism, putting de.finite 
condition to the leaders, in thi connection, before 
the eye of the mas e . Only frightened opportun-
i t , ye terday' alli of Purcell and Cook, of Chiang 
Kai- hek and Wang Chin Wei, can bind themselves 
beforehand by formal obligations against uch 
agreements. We mu t return from the empty of-
ficial's phra e about the united front to the policy 
of the united front as it wa formulated by Lenin 
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and alway applied by the Bolsheviks in 191'7. 
5. The problem of unemployment is one 
of the most important element of the political 
crisis. The struggle against capitalist rationali-
zcation and for the seven hou:r working day remains 
entirely on the order of th d1).y. But only 
the slogan of an extensive, planned collaboration 
with the oviet Union can raise this struggle to 
the height of the revolutionary ta ks. In the pro-
grammatic declaration for the election, the Cen-
tral Committee of the German Party states that 
after achievim.g power the Communists will e tablish 
economic collaboration with the Soviet Union. 
There i no doubt of thi . But a histo:rical per-
spective cannot be set up against the political tasks 
of the day. The orker , and the u employed in 
the first place, must be mobilized right now under 
the logan of extensive economic collaboration with 
the oviet republic. The State Planning Commis-
sion of the Union of Socialist ovi t Republics 
should work out a plan of economic collaboration 
with the participation of the German Communis s 
and trade unionists, which, using the pre ent un-
employment as it point of departure, is developed 
into an all-sided collaboration embracing all the 
basic branche of economy. The problem do not 
lie in promising to reconstruct economy after the 
eizure of power; it lies in eizing power. The pro-
blem is not to promise the collaboration of Soviet 
Germany with the U. . . R. but to win the work-
ing ma se for thi collaboration today, connecting 
it closely with the crisis and unemployment, and 
developing it further on in a gigantic plan for the 
socialist reconstruction of both countries. 
6. The political c:ris1s in Germany brings 
into question the Versailles regime in urope. The 
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Central Committee of the Germa.n Communist Party 
declares that, having taken power, the German pro-
letariat will liquidate the Ver aille documents. Is 
that all? The abolition of the Versa.ill Treaty 
a the highe t achie ement of the proletarian revo-
lution! What is to be put in it place? There is 
not a word about this. Such a negative way of 
putting the que tion brings the Party clo e to the 
ational ociali ts [Fa c· ts]. The Suoiet United 
States of Europe- that is the only correct slogan 
which points the way out of the dismemberment of 
Europe, which threatens not only Germany but 
the whole continent with complete economic and 
cultural decline. 
The slogan of the proletarian unification of 
Europe is at the same time a very important ea-
pon in the truggle again t the abomination of 
Fa ci t chauvini m, the baiting of France, and so 
forth. The most incorrect, the mo t dangerous 
policy is that of pas ive adaptation to the enemy 
by painting oneself to look like him. The logan 
of national madne mu t be oppo ~d by the slogans 
of international liberation. For thi , the Party 
must be purged of national socialism, the principal 
element of which i the theory of ociali m in one 
country. 
We have examined the question of the tacti-
cal turn in the Communist International exclusively 
in the light of the German situation because, in 
the first place, the German crisi now put the 
German Communist Party once more in the center 
of attention of the world proletarian vanguard, and 
because in the light of thi crisis all the problems 
are brought out in sharpest relief. It would not 
be difficult, however, to show that what has been 
said here also holds good, to one degree or another, 
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for other countrie . 
In France, all the form of class struggle 
after the war bear an immeasurably less sharp and 
less decjsive character than they do in Germany. 
But the general tendencies of develo'Dment are the 
ame, not to speak of the direct dependence of the 
fate of France upon the fate of Germany. At any 
rate, the t\ll"ll.S of tbe Communist lnter;iational 
have a univer al character. The French · Commun-
i t Party which was declared by Molotov back in 
1928 to be the first candidate for power, ha con-
ducted an ab olutely uicidal policy in the la t two 
~ ears. It e pecially overlooked the economic cri~s. 
The tactical turn as proclaimed in France at the 
very moment when th crisis began to take the place 
of the industrial revival. In this way, the ame con-
tradictions difficulties and tasks about which we 
speak in reference to Germany, are on the order of 
the day in France a well. 
The turn in the C. I., combined with the 
turn in the ituation, put new and eYceptionally 
important tasks before the Left Communi t Opposi-
tion. Its force are not big. But every current 
grows together with the growth of its ta ks. T o 
under tand them clearly is to pos ess one of the 
most important guarantee of victo'I'y. 
Prinkipo, September 26, 1980. 
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